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ABSTRACT 
Following a long and protracted survey of all targeted approach routes, cols of passage and exfiltration 
pathways projected to have been followed by Hannibal and his generals when they crossed into Italy in 218 
BC, the physical evidence points to the Col de la Traversette, first identified by Sir Gavin de Beer in the 
1960‘s. The first attempts to identify the route out of a dozen possible transits, focused not only on historical 
interpretations using the evolution of place names but on physical evidence possibly resident in hearths, al-
luvial terraces and rock rubble masses along the various approach routes. The primary argument following 
ten years of investigating every approach route from the Col Agnel in the south to the Col Mt. Cenis in the 
north, was that if the only blocking rockfall described by Polybius was present below the Traversette col, 
then mires or fans on either side in France and Italy might contain a record of Hannibal‘s passage. Beyond 
their key positions as water sources and foraging areas, the French mire and coalescing alluvial fan sediment 
in the upper Po, might carry evidence of the ecologic disturbance that could be radiocarbon dated to the 
Hannibal time line of 2168 cal yr BP or 218 BC. It is this long quest to unlock the Hannibalic invasion route 
that opened up key areas for historical archaeological exploration. This forensic cross/discipline exercise 
might serve to highlight a valuable method useful in solving other elusive ancient historical archaeological 
problems.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Hannibalic invasion route; forensic analysis of mire sediment; Po plains; Polybius; environmen-
tal 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The question of the route followed by Hannibal 
and his army in 218 BC, 2168 cal yr BP (BP=before 
present, 1950 AD) has rankled and irked historians 
and classicists for millennia (Freshfield, 1886, 1899; 
Dodge, 1891; de Montholon, 1905; Wilkinson, 1911; 
Walbank, 1956, 1990; Brown, 1963; de Beer, 1956, 
1967, 1969, 1974; Seibert, 1993) amongst others. No 
less than seven books were written about the inva-
sion in Hannibal‘s time (Proctor, 1971), the last 
known of which (by Silenus, Hannibal‘s historiog-
rapher) was destroyed by the great fire that con-
sumed the library at Alexandria in 300 AD. Since 
then a number of workers have posited possible 
routes (Fig. 1), basically dependent upon previous 
sources including the texts of Livy (trans. de Sélin-
court, 1965) and Polybius (trans. Paton, 1922; Scott-
Kilvert, 1979), but few have visited the sites in ques-
tion making their target cols all based on second-
hand information. While some have tried to correlate 
descriptions in ancient texts to the actual landscape 
and flooding times of rivers (de Beer, 1969), none 
have coupled the present environment with major 
topographic features in the ancient texts, let alone 
searched hearths, likely campgrounds, possible rock-
fall impediments to the exfiltration of the mountains. 
It is the purpose of this summary to outline the 
thinking that went into trying to elicit an environ-
mental matrix from the ancient texts, one that could 
be tested against the present landscape, a forensic 
exercise if you will (Mahaney, 2004, 2008a; Mahaney 
et al., 2008a, b, c).  
Assessing the Hannibalic Route one is faced with 
countless authorities arguing for one of the three 
principal routes (Fig. 1) over the other and most key 
authorities (Proctor, 1971; Lazenby, 1998; Lancel, 
1999) opting for the northern route principally be-
cause of lower elevation and ease of access. Only de 
Beer (1967, 1969, 1974), Prevas (1998), and Bagnall 
(1999) favor the southern route principally because 
times of flooding, place name matches, and view 
onto the Po plains closely align with Polybius and 
Livy. The middle route outlined by Connolly (1981) 
pitches indecision into Hannibal‘s thinking that once 
along the Isère and near Grenoble he would have 
shifted priority to finding the Col de Genèvre, the 
most unlikely deviation of travel plans. To enter into 
this historic mix, a daunting task as it were, required 
a test of environmental parameters elicited from the 
ancient texts of Livy and Polybius, forming a matrix 
of interconnected variables to determine which of 
the three routes, historic speculation aside, might be 
closest to the actual route traveled by the Punic Ar-
my.  
Despite the thinking of some workers that the 
landscape has changed greatly since the time of 
Hannibal‘s invasion, it is clear from environmental 
summaries published by Sodhi et al. (2006), Ma-
haney (2008a) and Mahaney et al. (2008a, b, c; 2016a, 
2018a) that the landscape we see today, despite 
many slight modifications by stream erosion and 
avalanche activity over the last two millennia, is the 
same as that seen by Hannibal and his army when 
they crossed into Italia in 218 BC. The landscape was 
set in place during the Late Pleistocene (the last ice 
age as it were), the final touches taking place during 
the Bølling and Allerød interstades that marked the 
first warming time since the retreat of ice, followed 
by a cosmic airburst of 12.8 ka (12,800 yrs) that fired 
the surface leaving a carbonized record in the land 
surface now resident in paleosols (ancient soils) and 
rock rinds (Mahaney and Keiser, 2013; Mahaney et 
al., 2013, 2014, 2016a, 2017d, 2018b). This airburst 
event, termed the black mat is also defined as the 
YDB-Younger Dryas Boundary-that marks the tran-
sition into a cold period called the Younger Dryas 
(YD, 12.8-~11.5 ka), a term resulting from earlier pol-
len work that identified variable pollen concentra-
tions of the cold loving plant (Dryas octapetala) in 
many alpine regions. The distribution of this plant 
increased during the Younger Dryas event, a glacial 
resurgence that resulted from a cold time, similar to 
a nuclear winter, projected to have been caused by 
the black mat airburst. 
The black mat event is known to have affected 
North, Middle and South America, Greenland, west-
ern Europe, Central Asia, (Wolbach, 2018a, 2018b), 
and is thought to have reached Antarctica (Mahaney 
et al., 2018c). Its effect on the Western Alps, particu-
larly the area around the Mt. Viso massif was pro-
found, burning the land surface and creating the 
largest accumulation of soot recorded so far in West-
ern Europe (Allen West, personal communication, 
2016). Portions of bedrock and much exposed glacial 
sediment were carbonized and melted by tempera-
tures topping 2000 oC. The event presumably melted 
all or most glacial vestiges of the ice age, to be short-
ly replaced by a resurgence of ice forming during the 
ensuing nuclear winter which produced revived 
positive glacial mass balances for more than a mil-
lennium.  
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Fig. 1. Invasion routes as proposed by several classicists. Figure reprinted after Mahaney et al. (2017a). Hannibal’s 
Rhône crossing point is not known with certainty but is probably near Arles south of Avignon. The ‘Island’, Hannibal’s 
resupply point is not known exactly but is probably near present-day Orange. Major tribes – Insubres and Ligures, al-
lied with Hannibal are shown within their nomadic areas; the Taurini refused overtures from Hannibal and were deci-
mated in late 218 BC. The Boii tribe, allied with Hannibal, occupied an area to the east near present-day Bologna. 
The YD event lasted for ~1.3 kyr, ending by ~11.5 
ka when glaciers worldwide went into recession, 
nearly disappearing in some cases by the Holo-
cene/Pleistocene boundary (~10 ka). By this time the 
landscape through which Hannibal passed had been 
set in place, all further change attributed to minor 
amounts of air-influxed material into soils and pale-
osols and mass wasted sediment additions to valley 
side locations (e.g. the younger rockfall sheet identi-
fied by Polybius) in local valleys). Losses of sedi-
ment accrued in valleys by stream erosion and de-
velopment of Holocene terraces only slightly modi-
fying the landscape in the area of the Col de la 
Traversette. The impediments to exfiltration faced by 
Hannibal are the very same as exist today on both 
the French and Italian sides of the Western Alps. It is 
within this matrix of bedrock and deposits that the 
search for environmental evidence related to the in-
vasion began in 2002. Starting as a means of match-
ing topographical descriptions and relative changes 
of elevation mentioned in ancient texts, the study 
soon morphed into a forensic test requiring the use 
of methods from diverse disciplines to answer ques-
tions related to camping places, foraging areas, de-
posit impediments, river crossings and other envi-
ronmental targets as they might have affected time 
motion analysis of the Punic Army. 
Polybius provides us with specific day-indicators 
of the invasion which allow for a total time travel of 
five months for the march from New Carthage to the 
Po plains, with four days from the Rhône crossing to 
the island, ten days from the island to the beginning 
of the ascent of the mountains, followed by fifteen 
days to reach the col. The assumption is that the fif-
teen days are included in the five months but Polyb-
ius is not certain about this. We do not know what 
Polybius meant by ‗ascent of the Alps‘ as this quote 
may mean ascent of the Dauphiné Alps or ascent 
following the debacle in the Combe de Queyras 
(Mahaney and Tricart, 2008). Taking the Rhône 
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crossing to the island to be approximately 40 km, the 
next leg to the Col de Grîmone a total of 180 km and 
allowing for negotiations and resupply efforts with 
local tribes at Orange to take 2-3 days, it is likely this 
might consume two weeks. If this is correct then the 
fifteen days to reach the col would include 105 km- 
Col de Grîmone to Durance basin, 5 km Durance to 
Guil catchment, 50 km Guil to Traversette, a total of 
160 km and would entail significant time to offset 
the Durance crossing difficulties, battle in the Combe 
de Queyras, and reorganization in the upper Guil 
probably taking six to eight days. The distance from 
the col to the Po plains is 30 km, the last ten km tak-
en up traveling through a steep gorge.  
Of the three routes identified in Fig. 1, both the 
northern and southern routes are approximately the 
same distance, only the terrain difference causing a 
slower rate on the southern leg. The middle route 
favored by Connolly (Fig. 1) is longer by about 50 
km and would have brought the Punic army to with-
in the territory of the Allobroges for a longer period 
that would have entailed many delays due to en-
gagements relative to the southern route. Putting 
time distance together for the full route, Polybius 
gives the distance as 9000 stadia (1597 km). During 
the first century BC, Strabo calculated 8.5 stadia to 
the Roman mile which equates to one stadium equal 
to 177.8 m. The Roman stadium is 0.1778 km, some-
what shorter than an Olympic stade which is 0.184 
km or 185 m. Distances were summarized by de Beer 
(1969) who assumed Strabo‘s calculations equaled 
Polybius‘ distances converted to km‘s as cited above.   
Of all the environmental parameters mentioned in 
the ancient texts of Polybius and Livy, including: 
nighttime attack on a col along the approach, snow-
line elevations, frozen ground (possibly permafrost), 
long defile below the ascendant col of passage, 
camping ground near the summit, hearths, view 
across the Po river plains, rockfall blockade during 
exfiltration to the Po river, regrouping area on the 
lee side, the one key element to identifying the route 
is the large, robust two-tier rockfall. All cols of pas-
sage have rockfall on the lee side of the Alps but the 
only pass with a large rubble sheet on the Po river 
side, one which could have impeded exfiltration, lies 
below the Col de la Traversette (~3000 m asl). As 
discussed by Mahaney et al. (2008c, 2010b, 2010c), 
this is the key element in the route puzzle that has 
mystified historians and classicists for over two mil-
lennia, and the one geomorphic feature as described 
by Polybius that certifies the southern route identi-
fied by Sir Gavin de Beer as the only possible en-
trance into cis-alpine Gaul transited by the Punic 
Army in the opening phase of the Second Punic War. 
Identification of the invasion route hinges on the 
doublet rockfall (Fig. 2), all other criteria, whether on 
the land surface or in section below the surface, must 
occupy a tangential position in the reconstruction on 
both the French and Italian sides of the Alps. Be-
cause most historians writing over centuries about 
the Punic Wars recounted historical documentation 
only with little regard to time/motion analysis of the 
Punic Army, and with scant attention paid to envi-
ronmental variables recounted here, it is easy to see 
why belief structures aligned with different groups 
favored one route over another. This, combined with 
a lack of ground truthing of routes tied to the ancient 
literature, led to embedded historical hypotheses 
lacking any evidence providing an outcome with 
little chance of finding artifacts that might support a 
particular route. 
Despite other route hypotheses expounded upon 
by many historians, including mention of routes 
closer to the Mediterranean coast and others further 
afield in Switzerland, such as the Great St. Bernard 
Pass one has to consider Hannibal‘s prime strategic 
objective pointed out by Hart (1967)---Linkage with 
Gallic tribes in cis-alpine Gaul—the Ligurian, Boii, 
and Insubre tribes with whom Hannibal had estab-
lished contact prior to the invasion. Travelling too 
close to the Mediterranean Coast would allow the 
Romans to maintain contact along the way and trav-
elling north of the Isère River would add to 
transport time, thus causing delays. Considering that 
Hannibal had reasonable information from agents 
sent to contact Gallic tribes in 219, returning to New 
Carthage (Polybius, III, 34) in spring 218 BC, and as 
expressed by Polybius, it is reasonable to assume he 
had knowledge of all major passes leading out of 
trans-alpine Gaul and that his objective col was the 
Col de Genèvre at ~2000m asl. Because the Gauls 
were shadowing him following departure of low-
land Gallic cavalry sent from Orange as guides (Po-
lybius III, 50), the Allobroges must have assumed 
Hannibal‘s intended crossing target, and realizing 
they could easily attack and defeat him with his cav-
alry ineffective in the narrow confines of the pass, 
they closed up on his rearguard (Polybius III, 52). 
Thus, with the Allobroges behind and ahead at his 
col target, either Hannibal or his second-in-
command, Maharbal, must have deviated into the 
Guil River and the gorge (Combe de Queyras) just 
beyond the Durance/Guil confluence (Fig. 1) as a 
means of bypassing the Allobroges. Aside from the 
rockfall on the lee side of the range, no other ap-
proach route carries the gorge obstacle described by 
Polybius and Livy (Mahaney et al., 2010b). In addi-
tion to the gorge and rockfall, all other environmen-
tal parameters described below line up with argu-
ments presented previously by Sir Gavin de Beer 
(1956, 1969) and fully support his southern route 
hypothesis.   
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Fig. 2. Traversette rockfall, the main impediment to Hannibal’s exfiltration from the Alps. Figure after Mahaney (2008a). 
2. REGIONAL BACKGROUND 
The regional background to the environmental 
constraints facing Hannibal and his troops is well 
explained in several works, notably, de Beer (1956, 
1969), Proctor (1971), Lancel (1999), Bagnall (1999), 
Mahaney (2008a), amongst others. Plunging into the 
environmental evidence that might be used to target 
key sites requiring historical archaeological recon-
struction has been the prime motivation behind 
work carried out by Mahaney (2004, 2008a), Ma-
haney et al. (2007b, 2008c, 2010a, b, 2010b, c, 2014) 
involved searching through possible reconstructions 
using methods from several disciplines, including 
geology, geomorphology, topography, astronomy, 
ecology, philology, palynology, chemistry, and geo-
chemistry. This differs substantially from other earli-
er attempts to identify the route, some aimed at 
naming the route through a local municipality simp-
ly to satisfy tourist activity (Proctor, 1971). Others 
centered on topography and the elevation of local 
cols supported by previous military strategists, Na-
polèon for example, that Hannibal had to have used 
a particular route. Conversely some routes were con-
sidered just too difficult for Hannibal to have negoti-
ated steep inclines and narrow ledges to move his 
animals and soldiers into Italia. Many workers seem 
to forget or overlook that Hannibal had a standing 
professional army and that his soldiers were not on-
ly capable of rapid movement, they were unencum-
bered by non-combatants and other non-essential 
personnel, and were used to movement in moun-
tainous terrain. 
Moreover, as previously outlined, the idea that 
the Hannibalic Army moved through a landscape 
vastly different from today has been disproven by 
glacial geological (Mahaney, 2008a; Mahaney et al., 
2016a) and cosmic airburst (Mahaney and Keiser, 
2013; Mahaney et al., 2018b) studies that show the 
landscape seen today is essentially the same as that 
seen by Hannibal and his troops. The only modifica-
tions to the land surface result from minor input of 
aeolian-influxed sediment to soils and paleosols, mi-
nor stream incision, and increase in the thickness of 
mass wasted deposits emplaced in the form of soli-
fluction deposits, debris flows, and rock and snow 
avalanches. Col elevations have changed little since 
Hannibal‘s time mostly with slight tectonic shifts 
raising height by a few meters.   
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
3.1 INITIAL RESEARCH STAGE 
Combining expertise as an environmental scientist 
working in various mountain environments on all 
continents over several decades, coupled with an 
interest in classical history, it is not unexpected that 
Hannibal‘s invasion over one of the most imposing 
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mountain chains on Earth might pique my interest in 
focusing on just how and where the invasion was 
carried out. Hannibal‘s feat of moving large numbers 
of troops, support personnel, horses, mules, let alone 
elephants, across elevations up to 3000 m has few 
rivals including such figures as Caesar, Belisarius, 
Charlemagne, Napolèon, even including such mod-
ern figures as Rommel in the Alps and the American 
10th Mountain Division in the Aleutians. Only Napo-
lèon comes close to the number count of the Hanni-
balic Army, and he, it seems never ventured close to 
the 3000 m mark. The question of the route itself has 
been the driving force of historians and classicists 
who usually quote each other in constructing 
‗proofs‘ of the invasion route, very few ever visiting 
the approach routes and cols in question. Up to the 
time of Mahaney (2004, 2008a) no one attempted to 
target key sites where historical archaeological ex-
ploration might reveal artifacts related to the inva-
sion of Hannibal or the later crossing of his brother, 
Hasdrubal, in 207 BC. Motivation to define the route, 
some consider to be the great question of antiquity 
(personal communication, T. Corey Brennan, 2004), 
seems to lie in the route designation itself, not to tar-
get key sites worth historical archaeological explora-
tion. This seems a strange quest to me as given the 
fact that the Hannibalic Army emerged onto the Po 
River plains, the route itself of little consequence ex-
cept that a route designate itself narrows the area of 
possible archaeological exploration. Moreover, doc-
umentation of key sites to explore might lead to the 
recovery of important information to elucidate the 
military culture of ancient Carthage. Hence, the en-
vironmental targets soon came to carry prime im-
portance in this forensic exercise. 
3.2 ENVIRONMENTAL MATRIX 
Reading Polybius and Livy, one comes away with 
a certain briefness attained by both historians de-
scribing the invasion, most probably because few 
could write and most place names were spoken only, 
maps way off in the future. That Hannibal probably 
had sketch maps made by his agents who crossed 
the Alps into northern Italia, it is a given that he 
probably knew in advance the positions of most ma-
jor routes, including those that sourced from the Du-
rance and Isère valleys. We may only suppose he 
had this information but it is certain that being the 
commander that he was he would not venture forth 
with an army without knowing his probable route. 
Most certainly, the only map of the Mediterranean 
(Strabo, trans. Jones, 1999) made two centuries after 
the invasion is nearly blank north of Massillia (Mar-
seilles) with a distorted Adriatic oriented nearly 
east-west (see Mahaney, 2008a, Fig. 2.2). Clearly be-
yond probable sketch maps and recollections of 
agents, Hannibal probably fixed on the lowest of all 
passes across the Col de Genèvre (~2000 m), general-
ly considered a main Gallic artery, later named 
Pompey‘s Pass when he led Roman armies into Gaul 
during the Civil Wars.  
If one assumes Hannibal intended to take the Du-
rance route to the Col de Genèvre he would have 
had to either swing his army eastward from the 
Rhône to take the Durance north or follow the Rhône 
to the Drôme confluence stopping near Orange to 
meet with lowland Gauls whom Polybius (III, 49) 
affirms he had made a previous arrangement for 
resupplying his army. Thus, it is highly unlikely that 
the army would resupply at Orange and trek north-
ward to follow the Isère route and even so, if this 
route is preferred, one is left wondering where the 
first mountain pass might be located before encoun-
tering the long defile along the final approach route 
to the high col. Further, if, as Polybius (III, 50) as-
serts, this first obstacle had to be taken in a night 
operation, the Gauls abandoning the high pass; the 
only possible cols are in the Dauphiné Alps—Col de 
Cabre (1193 m asl) and Col de Grîmone (1318 m 
asl)—and only the Grîmone pass fits the topographic 
assessment offered by Polybius (Mahaney, 2008a).  
Once across the Col de Grîmone and into the Du-
rance valley with local tribes in tow, Hannibal was 
faced with mounting obstacles, the followers and the 
Durance crossing. The followers gave up hostages 
and cattle but Polybius notes their friendship was 
uncertain and no doubt his scouts probed both the 
Guil passage and the Col de Genèvre. We shall never 
know why Hannibal diverted from the Genèvre to 
the Guil Valley, but if the Allobroges held the for-
mer, it is certain he would have sustained heavy 
losses trying to force passage. Polybius is certain that 
Hannibal was with his rear guard (often his position 
on the trail) making it likely, Maharbal, his second-
in-command was with the vanguard and may have 
made the decision to follow the Guil River. Appar-
ently the army deviated from the Durance following 
the Guil River into the major defile described by Po-
lybius, an 18-km long gorge with steep cliffs where 
the army was trapped by an assault on the rear eche-
lons and from the flanks, apparently with the ele-
phant corps and the cavalry up front, Gallic merce-
naries in the middle and Hannibal with African and 
Spanish contingents in the rear. It was the Gauls 
who got the worst of the assault (Mahaney and Tri-
cart, 2008), which lasted for a day, Hannibal re-
grouping his troops near a ‗certain bare rock‘ Polyb-
ius, III, 53) just inside the gorge entrance. The only 
large rock thus located is within 2 km of the gorge 
entrance as described by Mahaney (2008). However 
as described by Polybius (III, 53), with the flanks un-
protected the Allobroges carried out an enfilade at-
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tack hurling boulders and other loose debris from 
the heights onto the soldiers transiting the gorge and 
with terrifying effect. Because this account is the on-
ly one matching the present topography with the 
ancient texts, it is probable that Hannibal marched 
from the Drôme to the Durance and into the Guil 
basin. Following the initial engagement in the lower 
foothills, the only such large and long gorge is the 
Combe de Queyras as described by Mahaney 
(2008a), all other approach routes leading to Mt. Ce-
nis and Col Clapier lacking a long narrow defile (see 
Mahaney et al., 2008c, 2010c).Putting the two main 
sources of the invasion together, and considering 
that Livy never left Padua and wrote 180 years after 
the invasion, while Polybius followed the invasion 
67 years after the event, following interviews with 
people who, he says, had taken part in events, Polyb-
ius‘ account is preferred. Polybius likely traveled 
quite possibly with sketches from Silenus in hand, 
and it is he who provides the most convincing topo-
graphic, environmental, and possible stratigraphic 
information related to the mountain crossing. 
Whereas the topography is described in general 
terms by both historians, it is Polybius who provides 
more detail on the approach defile, snow, frozen 
ground, view from the col, the rockfall blockage of 
the exfiltration route and the regrouping area below 
the rockfall. It is Polybius‘ rockfall description of a 
two-tier rock system that places him within the ranks 
of the stratigraphic elite of history as he clearly un-
derstood that one deposit was older, the second 
younger. In translation, at least, he is quoted as in-
terpreting one deposit overlying another, a strati-
graphic succession clearly seen even today based on 
weathering differences displayed on cobbles and 
boulders in the mass wasted deposits (Mahaney, 
2008a; Mahaney et al., 2014).  
Polybius was presumably an accomplished mili-
tary officer but his observation places him within a 
group of extremely keen interpreters of the land-
scape. Few, even today, would venture across the 
Traversette rockfall and recognize two superposed 
rock deposits distinguished principally on weather-
ing features and soil morphogenesis. Perhaps such 
weathering features as color and oxidation states of 
clasts in the two deposits were likely more apparent 
in Polybius‘ time than today since the youngest mass 
would likely have lacked major lichen cover and ox-
idation effects would have had an age of only a few 
centuries if the observations of Mahaney (2008a) are 
correct. 
Thus, key environmental parameters comprise an 
environmental matrix, construed from Polybius and 
Livy, the former relying on those works available to 
him from afar including most likely the journals of 
Silenus who accompanied Hannibal as topographer 
and scrivener, thin with particulars as they are. The-
se parameters include the following:  
First, the crossing of the Durance and decision to 
follow the Guil River, if made by Marhabal, follows 
from assessments by Basil Hart (1967) who mentions 
the unusual authority delegated by Hannibal to 
Marhabal who often led the vanguard. As previous-
ly pointed out, we shall never know who made the 
decision to tackle the highest route but it is certain 
that Hannibal did not want to fight the Allobroges 
(Polybius, III, 52). The defile leading to the high 
slopes, following a lengthy survey of all possible 
approach routes (Mahaney et al., 2010b) targets only 
one candidate, the Combe de Queyras (Mahaney, 
2008a), the only gorge with the right length of ~18 
km. No other approach route offers the same topo-
graphic obstacle with steep walls providing the 
Gauls with a rock source to be hurled at the Cartha-
ginians (Mahaney, et al., 2010b).  
Second, taking snow accumulation into account, 
assuming the crossing was in October, 218 BC, it is 
not unusual in the Alps. The snowline was probably 
similar to today (Neumann, 1992) but a sudden 
snowfall may have produced melting followed by 
freezing at the ground/snow interface which would 
make footing difficult. Such a snowfall might extend 
as low as 2000 m which indicates the army‘s first 
contact occurred above the long defile, most proba-
bly near the present Chateau Queyras. It is possible 
higher up that soldiers slid on sporadic permafrost 
but this is uncertain as no permafrost was encoun-
tered during later investigations (Mahaney et al., 
2007a; Mahaney, 2008a). Polybius mentions (III, 54) 
that following the assault in the defile the time was 
near the setting of the Pleiades, which meant early 
November. Polybius (Scott Kilvert, trans, 1979) men-
tions that this could mean even the end of Septem-
ber, 218 BC, but snow could start this early in fall. As 
pointed out by several authors, including Polybius, 
the crossing is documented to have occurred at the 
setting of the Pleiades (Walbank, 1956; Polybius, 
1979; Livy, 1965), the astronomical record allowing 
that the Carthaginians were favored by a ―Hunter‘s 
Moon‖ (Full Moon on October 30; Proleptic Julian 
Calendar, documented by Prof. D. H. Seaquist, Uni-
versity. of Toronto in Mahaney et al. (2008c) which 
would have provided sufficient moonlight for the 
descent on the Italian side to have taken place on a 
twenty-four hour regimen. The moon‘s elevation 
above the horizon at the time of transit (about 54 
degrees at this site) was the highest for the year, fa-
vorable for illuminatiion of the rugged surface and 
deepening valley of the descent into the upper Po. 
Nevertheless, single file evacuation of ~20,000 infan-
try, ~7,000 cavalry (horses plus men), ~10,000 draft 
horses/mules, ~5,000 handlers and 37 elephants 
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would require an estimated ~200 hr (i.e. 6-8 24-hour 
days) to clear the col and upper valley, which is 
within the estimated three days to clear a path 
through the rockfall (Polybius, III, 55). Whereas we 
cannot be sure of the troop/animal numbers outside 
of the elephants, we do know that Hannibal 
emerged from the mountains with 26,000 soldiers, a 
figure documented by Polybius (III, 33) from the 
bronze tablet in the Temple of Hera at Cape Lacini-
um, a summary considered correct by most modern 
workers (de Beer, 1969; Lazenby, 1998; Lancel, 1999). 
Thus, with this number of Carthaginian infantry and 
cavalry and 37 elephants, it is reasonable to assume 
his baggage train contained at least several thousand 
horses and mules for which an unknown number of 
handlers would be needed. Adding in cooks, artifi-
cers, armourers and engineers, the entire army prob-
ably numbered (considering losses during the as-
cent) a number in excess of 26,000 soldiers emerging 
onto the Po River plains.   
Third, regrouping area in the upper valley, uni-
dentified until Mahaney et al., 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 
discovered churned-up beds in alluvial mire sedi-
ment (Fig. 3) at 2800 m dated to within the Hannibal 
window of 2168 cal yr BP. These beds (Mahaney et 
al., 2017a), at approximately ~40 cm depth, with ~15 
cm amplitude, contain faecal biomarkers [(5β-
stigmastanol and the bile acid deoxycholic acid 
(DCA)] (Mahaney et al., 2017b) related to horse and 
mule manure with roundworm eggs and bacteria, 
the latter belonging to microbe groups of Firmacut-
ies and Clostridia related to gut release from horses 
and mules (Mahaney et al., 2017b). These findings 
show the passage of thousands perhaps tens of thou-
sands of animals and potentially humans. Studies of 
the magnetic susceptibility of sediment within the 
French mire showed a slight increase in the churned-
up beds of several sections (Mahaney et al., 2017c) 
which may relate either to abnormal concentrations 
of magnetite or to the presence of weathered arti-
facts. In any case the mire should be subjected to a 
metal detection survey and possibly to GPR (ground 
penetrating radar) investigations. As well, lowland 
areas behind the Younger Dryas moraines adjacent 
to the Guil mire should also be subjected to similar 
surveys. 
Fourth, the col from which Hannibal looked 
across the plains of the Po is one of the main envi-
ronmental parameters cited by historians. Investiga-
tions at all possible crossing places indicate the 
Traversette col is the only passage which gives a 
long view, on a clear day nearly to Milan (de Beer, 
1969). The two cols adjacent to the Traversette—Col 
Agnel and Col de la Croix—offer restricted views 
cross country and do not look down upon the Po 
plains. Because Polybius definitely targets the Po 
river plains as the exfiltration point, thus excluding 
the Dora Riparia leading to the Po from the Clapier 
and Cenis cols some 50 km to the north. Polybius 
(III, 54) is said to have called his men to the col and 
pointed the way toward Rome to reassure them, but 
he could not have amassed the entire army on any of 
the cols, and the Col de la Traversette itself could 
barely hold 100 soldiers, so he must have addressed 
his key lieutenants not the entire army.  
Fifth, the rockfall in question can only be found 
below the Traversette col, a mass of rubble matching 
closely to Polybius‘ estimate of 250 m wide and 
comprised of two stages of development, one older 
and the other and upper one younger. While Livy 
mentions that Hannibal fired the rockfall to heat and 
split boulders, Polybius is mute on the subject, indi-
cating the firing event never happened. Further, fol-
lowing an extensive investigation of the rockfall sur-
face, clasts embedded in the deposit surface did not 
reveal any vestige of recent firing, no carbonized 
material (Mahaney et al., 2008c, 2010b). It appears 
the rockfall firing episode described by Livy is mere 
fiction, and more to the point, where and how would 
wood be obtained as firing material by soldiers close 
to starvation (Bagnall, 1999) and with timberline far 
below the rock mass. 
Sixth, the regrouping area could lie below any one 
of a number of possible cols of passage but the likely 
area below the Traversette is on a bedrock plateau 
floored with mire and coalescing alluvial fans (Fig. 
4) at ~2000 m asl, the latter of which reveal a 
churned-up bed similar to the alluvial mire on the 
French side (Mahaney et al., 2018a). That the lee side 
area has been used for centuries is obvious from a 
stone house, complete with animal quarters and a 
urine trough oriented north south, draining onto 
slopes on the north flank of the Po river and stone 
walls at around 2250 m used to pen animal stock as 
described by (Mahaney et al., 2010a). 
Seventh, most historic arguments have mentioned 
Hannibal‘s famous elephants but few have ques-
tioned the ability of elephants to make the journey 
over the Alps. John Hoyte (Hoyte, 1960) of Oxford 
University experimented with an elephant crossing 
Mt. Cenis showing that it was possible and that 
Hannibal could easily have managed at least the 
crossing to the north at lower elevation. However, 
elephants are known to work at high elevations as 
documented by Mahaney (1990) reaching elevations 
above 4500 m. Thus, crossing the Traversette col at 
~3000 m asl would have been possible although dif-
ficult given the narrowness of track in place and lack 
of forage. The remains of Hannibal‘s elephants have 
been found in the Arno terraces near Florence (Ro-
mano and Palombo, 2017). 
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Fig. 3. French mire at 2850 m astride a tributary to the Guil River (see Mahaney et al., 2017c). Areas like this, although 
scarce, are considered to provide water and forage to Hannibal’s projected route into Italia (cis-alpine Gaul). The 
Younger Dryas moraine and surrounding glacial landscape set in place during the last ice age has been little modified 
right up to today. Hence, despite claims to the contrary, the landscape viewed by the Punic Army is the same as exists 
today. Photography by Pierre Tricart. 
Eighth, dating the evidence required using relative 
vs. absolute methods. Relative age-dating methods rely 
on criteria that relate one topographic/geomorphic 
entity against another using, for example, height of 
one terrace over another (ex. Mahaney et al., 2016b), 
the difference in elevation a measure of the erosion 
event followed by a deposition (filling process). In 
other cases, changes in strength of weathering and 
soil development have been used to establish rela-
tive ages in many alpine areas (ex. Mahaney and 
Kalm, 2013). Also, if different in time the older de-
posit is expected to carry stronger pedogenesis, that 
is, a more complex weathering profile compared 
with the younger deposit. One cannot say for certain 
what time is involved, only that a soil (e.g. paleosol) 
in the older terrace represents greater time for de-
velopment. Also, hearths in deposits that may have 
been used as bivouacs for a long time may contain 
stratigraphic evidence belonging to ecologic disturb-
ance, possibly the Hannibal event, and may contain 
charcoal material that could be dated by AMS C14. 
Where reported, all soil descriptions follow the Can-
ada Soil Survey Committee (1998) and the USDA 
(Soil Survey Staff, 1999). All soil and sediment colors 
reported in the literature are based on the color chips 
of Oyama and Takehara (1970). 
The Traversette rockfall, a case in point, illustrates 
how surface weathering features (i.e. color of surface 
clasts) resulting from physical and chemical altera-
tion that distinguishes the two deposits could be 
used to separate deposits in time (Mahaney et al., 
2014). In this case we know the older lobe of debris is 
>12.8 ka because it contains cosmic material correlat-
ed to the black mat event (Mahaney and Keiser, 
2013) and the paleosol within can be correlated to 
Late Glacial (15 ka-12.8 ka) sediment); the younger 
lobe contains less weathered clastic materials related 
to weathering and soil development considered to be 
of middle Neoglacial (~3.0 ka) age; thus the sedi-
ment seen by Polybius must be >2.2 ka. Polybius, of 
course was most likely guided by the color differen-
tial which clearly delineated the two deposits on the 
basis of chemical alteration products (i.e., oxides and 
hydroxides) and illustrates his extraordinary powers 
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of observation. My interpretation of the rockfall and 
its importance in the route interpretation was criti-
cized by Kuhle and Kuhle (2012) who favored along 
with others the northern route via the Col de 
Clapier, an entrance to cis-alpine Gaul for which 
there is little supporting evidence (Mahaney, 2008a). 
The evidence for the Traversette rockfall as the key 
site supporting the southern route of de Beer (1969) 
was summarized by Mahaney (2013). 
 
Fig. 4. Upper Po valley, with Pian de Re albergo off to the left, and mire and coalescing alluvial fans showing core and 
section sites V21, V21A and V21B (in center). Photography and site annotation by Peeter Somelar; figure after Mahaney 
et al. (2018a). Core and section data from these sites is interpreted in Mahaney et al. (2018a).  
To obtain absolute ages on materials in this case re-
lies only on radiocarbon (Mahaney et al., 2017a, b, 
and c), which is used to date relict organic material 
buried in section. Because the half-life of the 14C iso-
tope is 5710 yrs most of the recovered organic mate-
rial relevant to solving the Hannibal enigma is well 
within the first one-half of the first half life decay 
process, which means that providing there is no con-
tamination of samples one can expect accurate dates 
with low standard deviations. However, since rele-
vant samples are within ~50 cm depth there is al-
ways the possibility of leaching of younger organic 
carbon downward in section, thus producing 
younger ages and wider standard deviations. Cou-
ple to this, the possibility of ground water influx into 
older sediment, the addition of younger organic car-
bon as disolved organic matter may produce the 
same effect. We may get around this by careful scru-
tiny of the standard deviations for each date to in-
sure the standard deviation is <3% or approximately 
~60 yr or less. The maximum age possible for con-
ventional radiocarbon dates is ~40 kyr; this increases 
to ~70 kyr for AMS (Accelerator Mass Spectrometry) 
dates, with somewhat smaller standard deviations 
for the latter method. All AMS radiocarbon analysis 
and date assignment follow Bronk Ramsey (2009), 
Bronk Ramsey and Lee (2013) and Reimer et al. 
(2013).  
An inventory of possible sites for radiocarbon da-
ting along the targeted routes produces alluvial ter-
races covered with surface soils and buried pale-
osols, alluvial fans along valley sides, alluvial mires, 
and possible hearths. In most alpine areas of the 
world bogs and lacustrine plains often provide a 
means of obtaining bog-bottom 14C dates which are, 
at best, minimum ages on organic remains in depos-
its within which such materials are found. Once a 
depression is formed it may infill with inorganic sed-
iment for a time (ecesis period), before which recog-
nizable organic remains accumulate which can be 
dated; hence, the minimum age designated. Lacus-
trine plains, reacting to lake level fluctuations may 
contain buried soils that may be dated by 14C but 
these are not present in suitable positions to add to 
the Hannibal story. To add hearths to the list re-
quires one to overcome the speculation that requires 
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one to think that Hannibal‘s army would not pass up 
a site like this and some assurance that Hannibal 
actually took the route specified. The same applies to 
alluvial terraces and with these surfaces the prospect 
of organic retention is not great which means large 
samples are required to obtain even minimum or-
ganic residue that might be obtained for dating. Al-
luvial mires, both in the upper Guil and Po catch-
ments, present the best options for dating because 
water velocities are low and retention of weathered 
organic sediment is great combining to preserve dis-
turbed sediment beds from some previous episode 
of bioturbation such as disturbance from a foraging 
army. In the case of the upper Po drainage the pres-
ence of an endangered species of salamander re-
quired that all sampling be relegated to alluvial fans 
away from mire sediments that might have yielded 
better results both in terms of the physical and strat-
igraphic evidence (Mahaney et al., 2018a).  
Pulling cores and digging sections in alluvial sed-
iment produces planar beds aligned horizontally 
with the earth‘s surface so that variance in flow re-
gime and or changes in source sediment produce 
sorted sediment even in beds with high organic in-
put. Cores of 50-70 mm diameter limit the amount of 
recovered material for dating and chemical analyses 
whereas sections produce open faces with widths of 
50 cm + allowing collection of material for replicate 
dating where necessary and higher weight material 
for laboratory analyses of various kinds. The analyst 
expects to collect downward from the surface into 
progressively older beds (shown below in Fig. 5) and 
if bioturbated (churned-up) beds are encountered 
such disturbed beds will produce wavelengths and 
amplitudes of distorted beds with various dimen-
sions, physical evidence normally not seen in cores. 
In the case of the French vs. the Italian sediment 
complexes, one might expect the softer French sedi-
ment to deform to a greater degree than the Italian 
coarser sediment, which is approximately what hap-
pened. The French sediment sites showed an ap-
proximate center of disturbance at 40 cm ± 15 cm 
amplitude whereas the Italian sites showed disturb-
ance centered at 45 cm ± 10-15 cm in two out of three 
sites; 60 cm ± 15 cm in the third site. The variation in 
depth of disturbance is explained by differences in 
sedimentation rates partly the result of a wetter cli-
mate in Italy compared with France.  
Aside from the loss of planar beds nearly horizon-
tal to the Earth‘s surface that is common to mire and 
alluvial fan deposits (Mahaney, 1990), sediment 
within the bioturbated beds is commonly much 
darker (addition of faecal matter and reworked hu-
mus) than variegated colors encountered up or 
down section from the disturbed beds. Common 
color ranges within the bioturbated beds are: 10YR 
1/1, 2/1; 7.5YR 1/1, 2/2, 2,2; to 5YR 1/1,2/1. YR 
refers to hue, the dominant wavelength, where de-
creasing color refers to strengthening of the yellow 
red color. The two numbers that follow refer to bril-
liance with increasing value from dark to light, and 
chroma, purity of dominant wavelength, which in-
creases with decreasing white light. Common wave-
lengths for young sediment such as in the upper Po 
Valley are 10YR (yellow red) and 2.5Y (yellow), the 
former for various degrees of weathering and the 
latter for fresh, unweathered sediment. To use the 
analogy of a cube to which hue, value and chroma 
are measured along three edges (Millar et al., 1966), 
each color notation represents a point in the cube, 
i.e., the Munsell notation. Within each major hue 
represented here, a lower value and chroma repre-
sent a darker and more carbon-rich sediment. For 
lithology in the field area, I relied on geological 
mapping by Tricart et al. (2003). 
One of the great assets of working in the Guil and 
Po valleys rests on the detailed bedrock mapping 
(Tricart et al., 2003) carried out by Pierre Tricart and 
his associates from the Institute of Geology, Univer-
sity of Grenoble. Having bedrock control for all sites 
explored in this area insured that lithologic relation-
ships could be worked out in the laboratory prior to 
engaging in field work.  
Finding the churned-up bed is one part of the 
task, dating the transition zones to younger beds up 
section and older planar beds down section, and ex-
plaining the greater than 2168 cal yr BP dates within 
the bioturbated mass still another. The boundaries of 
the bioturbated mass are so diffuse that the relevant 
radiocarbon dates may not truly reflect start up and 
shut down of the bioturbation process even though 
the two dates should be approximately the same, 
that is, representative of the x number of days re-
quired to produce the bioturbated bed. To further 
complicate the dating process it is necessary to pro-
duce a string of dates from near the surface to ap-
proximately the top of the churned-up bed which is 
a hit or miss proposition as shown in Fig. 5 that re-
lates to section V21A in Mahaney et al. (2018a) 
where the upper boundary is ~40 cm, the lower 
boundary at 55 cm but with some variance given the 
magnitude of disturbance.  
3.3 INTERPRETING THE PROOFS  
The lead up to the only possible defile along the 
approach route, the Combe de Queyras, is along ei-
ther the Drôme River from the Rhône or from the 
south along the Durance. The southern route of 
some 150 km from the Durance/Rhône confluence 
does not lead to a col described by both Polybius 
and Livy but the Drôme approach does end at the 
Col de Grîmone in the Dauphiné Alps, the topogra-
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phy of which matches the landscape where Hannibal 
himself led a night operation to secure passage. The-
se lowland routes have been thoroughly discussed 
by de Beer (1969) and Proctor 1971), as to likely di-
versions, but the Drôme route would take Hannibal 
close to the Col de Genèvre (~2000 m), his likely in-
tended col of passage.  
As Hannibal‘s army approached and crossed the 
Durance, Hannibal was followed by the Allobroges 
who threatened his rear echelons (Polybius, III, 52). 
The question of why the Carthaginians diverted 
through the Guil valley from the Durance instead of 
marching towards the Col de Genèvre is uncertain 
but what is certain is that Hannibal was with the rear 
guard and the army, often led by Maharbal (Hart, 
1967) who, according to Polybius, was informed of 
other Allobroges massing at the target col. Polybius 
is on record saying he did not want to fight the 
Allobroges, so it is possible the order to move 
through the Combe de Queyras came from Ma-
harbal, Hannibal having his energies directed to the 
rear. If this is correct, it is odd, if not unusual, that 
the flanks were not protected adequately because 
once into the defile presented by the Combe, the 
Gauls unleashed a ferocious attack that nearly over-
ran the rear of the army (Polybius, III, 53). Because 
the elephants and cavalry were up front it was the 
Gallic mercenaries who caught the brunt of missiles 
and rocks hurled from the high ridges astride the 
Combe, the result being that Hannibal suffered 
heavy losses from what appears to be an enfilade 
attack a tactical maneuver similar to what he himself 
later used at Trasimene against the Romans in the 
Apennines (Mahaney and Tricart, 2008), a more 
modern example coming from Lee‘s attack on the 
Union Army at Gettysburg during the American 
Civil War.  
Investigations carried out in the Combe de Quey-
ras over the period 2002-2010 by Mahaney and Tri-
cart (2008) pinpointed unusually large accumula-
tions of boulders and cobbles along and at the base 
of the northwestern wall with the Guil River to the 
southeast. It would appear that even in Hannibal‘s 
time the approach was to the west of the river but 
recent flood control efforts may have rearranged 
some of the rubble deposits, so finding artifacts in 
this mass would prove difficult and probably impos-
sible.  
 
Fig. 5. Radiocarbon dated beds in section V21A showing the age progression from near the surface to approximately ~40 
cm depth, the transition from time of normal sedimentation to the onset of massive ecological disturbance, i.e., the 
churning event. The >2168 cal yr BP dates represent sediment transported into the churned up morass by animals, hu-
mans or natural processes such as surface runoff or aeolian influx. Figure from Mahaney et al. (2018a). Color designa-
tions for dark to light beds are as explained above. 
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Following the Guil River toward the high col, the 
only camping or regrouping place is between 2400 
and 2650 m alongside the main drainage and a tribu-
tary that passes the G5 alluvial mire sites (Fig. 3) in-
vestigated by Mahaney et al. (2017a, 2017b and 
2017c). To the south of the G5 sites several low-lying 
flat lacustrine plains offer some forage opportunities 
that were likely used by the Punic forces as they re-
formed following the battle below in the Combe de 
Queyras. Attempts to section two of these sites to the 
south of G5 (Mahaney et al., 2017c) produced incon-
clusive results indicating the ecologically disturbed 
beds are likely deeper than ~1 m. If, as Polybius (III, 
54) indicates, the army camped in snow, some of 
these depressions were probably used as water 
sources and even today the main Guil river drains 
the south side of the valley and would have provid-
ed a valuable source of water. More to the point, 
given the faecal matter and microbe analysis carried 
out at the G5 site (Mahaney et al., 2018b), which in-
dicates widespread accumulation of animal and pre-
sumably human defecation, the entire moraine com-
plex at 2400 to 2600 m asl in the upper Guil Valley is 
probably laden with metagenomic DNA and fossil 
faecal matter related to Hannibal‘s Army.  
Reaching the Col de la Traversette at ~3000 m on a 
clear day, one can see across the Po plains below to 
some distance, possibly as far as Milan, as de Beer 
(1969) has stated. The usual view from below the Col 
de la Traversette is obscured by clouds as illustrated 
on the cover of The Warmaker (Mahaney, 2008b). 
Other route passages to the north at Col de Clapier 
and Col de Mt. Cenis have limited views from the 
summit and all look down upon the Dora Riparia 
which joins the Po River where Hannibal sortied 
against the Roman Army of Scipio whence he made 
contact, first at the Ticinus and latter at the Trebbia 
before retiring into winter quarters to the south.  
The main proof for the Traversette Route is the 
blocking rockfall at 2600 m, the doublet deposits of 
such, the oldest lobes dating to at least 12.8 ka be-
cause they carry the black mat signature (12.8 ka) 
seen with microscopic analysis carried out by Ma-
haney and Keiser (2013) dating the early accumula-
tion of rubble to the Late Glacial and well before 
Hannibal‘s time. The younger rubble accumulation 
that covers nearly three-quarters of the rockfall area 
is most likely of middle Neoglacial age judging by 
weathering features and soil morphogenesis that 
compares favorably with soil research carried out 
previously by Mahaney (1991). There is no similar 
rockfall deposit on the lee side of the Alps that 
would stop an army, only minor accumulations of 
rock rubble below all other passes (Sodhi et al., 
2006).  
3.4 ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES 
Acceptance of the premise of both Polybius and 
Livy that Hannibal‘s army foraged in the catchment 
below the two-tier rockfall for a period of five days, 
such activity should have ravaged the upper valley 
and be recorded in the alluvial fan sediment record-
ed there. Any existing soil would have been ground 
up and mixed with sediment in situ and imported by 
animal action. Because the surface soils at all three 
sites are similar (about 12-cm thickness with A (Ah), 
C, Cu horizons, classed as Entisols (Soil Survey Staff, 
1999) or Regosols (CSSC, 1998), correlation with sim-
ilar pedons in the upper Guil Valley (Mahaney et al. 
2016a) suggests these profiles are young and have 
been in situ for only two centuries or less. Both soil 
suites date to the end of the Little Ice Age (less than 
170 yr), and their existence further suggests the soils 
have been protected from flooding that may have 
occurred since that time. Deeper into the three sec-
tions of the upper Po river valley, and the multiple 
sections of G5 in the upper Guil valley of France, 
darker beds encountered suggest periodic or aperi-
odic attempts to produce Histosols or soils with 
dominant organic compounds relative to inorganic 
sediment. However, because these organic beds lack 
oxidized horizons, it appears such attempts, alt-
hough possibly long-lived in some cases, did not 
produce pedons.  
Alternative testable hypotheses to bioturbation 
(churning) of sediment caused by Hannibal‘s Army 
might be: (1) upper flow regime flooding; (2) earth-
quake vibration; (3) transhumance; and (4) soil cry-
oturbation. The upper Po Valley is susceptible to 
extreme climatic events originating out of the Adri-
atic, as illustrated in 2008 when excessive precipita-
tion induced intensive mass wasting and flooding in 
the form of debris flows that inundated valleys and 
buried deposits up and down the Western Alps from 
Mt Cenis all the way to the south of Mt Viso (Ma-
haney et al. 2010a, 2010b). Such flooding events pro-
duced well-sorted and stratified sediment succes-
sions lacking the mixed-sediment character of the 
bioturbated beds seen in the French mire and in the 
upper Po sections described here. Whereas turbulent 
flooding events are possible and cannot be totally 
discounted, the available evidence indicates that bio-
turbation is the process that produced the observed 
sediment disruption. As reported by Mahaney et al. 
(2018a), particle size tests on a random collection (n 
= 6) of small samples taken from the churned-up bed 
in V21A in the upper Po valley, show extreme varia-
tions in texture ranging from coarse sands (some-
times with pebbles) to fine silts and clay with no 
sorting visible. Water-sorted sediment recovered 
from alluvial/colluvial fans and lake beds (see Ma-
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haney, 1990) follow the principle of horizontality, 
that is, beds are parallel with the Earth‘s surface. Un-
less disturbed by high-velocity currents, such as ex-
treme flooding that occurs with jökulhlaups etc. or 
moraine bursts, such bedding is nearly horizontal 
with the Earth‘s surface. Exhaustive studies of Holo-
cene alluvial fans on Mt Kenya (Mahaney, 1990) 
failed to produce distorted bedding despite the pres-
ence of active glaciers releasing meltwater during 
postglacial time. 
Freeze–thaw processes in resident soils might 
produce convoluted beds or horizons which are not 
parallel in extracted cores or in dug sections excavat-
ed in the alluvial fans. Such convolutions usually 
leave beds or laminae intact, that is, upturned but 
lacking a disrupted or mixed quality such as is evi-
dent in the churned-up beds described here. In any 
case, heavy snowfall in the Western Alps provides 
an insulating medium that may counteract freeze–
thaw processes in underlying soils (for examples of 
Cryosols, see Mahaney and Kalm, 2013). 
Transhumance might be expected to produce sed-
iment disturbance and it is an activity known to 
have occurred in the upper Po Valley, as in several 
Italian valleys, over several centuries, but no record 
of churned-up or bioturbated sediment exists above 
the proposed Hannibal beds identified at c.2200 cal 
yr BP in the subject area. Indeed, while transhu-
mance has been prohibited in the upper Po Valley 
since the Second World War, the surface soil profiles 
in resident alluvial fans—V21, V21A and V21B—lack 
any sign of physical disturbance, which supports 
similar evidence reported in the upper Guil Valley of 
France, all this despite the ongoing practice of trans-
humance occurring every year (Mahaney et al., 2016, 
2017a) in the Guil Valley. Linking the churned-up 
beds in cores and sections in the upper Po Valley 
with the Hannibal event of 2168 cal BP means there 
is a time correlation between the churning event and 
the reconnaissance of the Hannibalic route in the 
upper Po Valley, Italy‘s postulated passage of Han-
nibal. However unlikely, the coeval relation between 
the churning event and high-resolution dating may 
relate to some other anthropomorphic event not rec-
orded in history. The churning event may also be 
partly related to menacing Gallic tribes following 
Hannibal after the altercation in the 18-km defile, as 
described by Polybius (Polybius/Scott-Kilvert, 1979, 
III, 53; surface analysis by Mahaney, 2008a). It re-
mains for DNA analysis to link firmly recovered mi-
crobes and helminth parasite eggs with Spanish 
and/or North African animals. 
While extremely sidelined as a probable cause of 
the churned-up beds, vibrations caused by earth-
quake activity might be expected to produce dislo-
cated materials but with bed-to-bed or lamina-to-
lamina stratigraphy, which is clearly lacking in the 
disrupted beds of the sediment stack reported by 
Mahaney et al. (2018a). Similar experiments using 
vibration tables have illustrated the effects of earth-
quake activity on sediment sorting (Miyamoto et al., 
2007), forcing dislodged sediment into discrete 
groups. Whereas earthquake activity in the Western 
Alps is known to be an ongoing process, the deposits 
under investigation here show little sign of full-scale 
vibration or neotectonic activity.  
Competing routes for the Hannibalic invasion are 
shown in Figure 1 (Mahaney et al., 2017a), although 
various other authors (i.e., Guillaume, 1967; Proctor, 
1971) have argued for other cols adjacent to the 
Traversette and Mt Cenis, without linking topo-
graphic and geomorphologic evidence to support 
their claims. Time/motion analyses (Mahaney 
2008a) of the northern (Cenis) versus the southern 
(Traversette) show the Traversette route to be slight-
ly shorter but more rugged over the Traversette 
pass, longer over the less rugged Mt Cenis. This as-
sumes that Polybius clearly differentiated between 
the Po plains and the plains adjacent to the Dora Ri-
paria (a northern tributary of the Po River). The only 
route leading to the Po plains is over the Traversette. 
All variations between elevations, snowline, pres-
ence of frozen ground, long defile on the approach to 
the mountains and a large rock just inside the defile 
entrance have been discussed by Mahaney (2008a). 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The various stages of reconstructing the Hannibal 
enigma illustrate just how information buried in the 
classical literature might be reconstructed to provide 
an environmental matrix that can be tested using 
various scientific analyses. In this case, work started 
with a topographic and geomorphologic base that 
could be used to provide time/motion analysis to 
establish movement of the Punic Army, results indi-
cating that of the three proposed routes outlined in 
Fig. 1, only the middle route is the longest, the 
northern and southern routes almost identical in 
time distance but not regarding physical obstacles. 
The southern route across the highest of all passes 
with the most rugged terrain would require extra 
time but just how much is unknown. The battle in 
the approach defile and construction through the 
rockfall placed heavy burdens on the army, especial-
ly since as Polybius indicates they lost much of their 
provisions and this must have put a strain on ani-
mals, principally upon the elephant corps.  
Beyond the initial phase, expertise in a variety of 
fields was required to put numbers to the allotted 
time of crossing requiring mathematical/statistical 
studies and astronomical calculations as to the 
amount of moonlight, and timing of movement with 
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the hunter‘s moon. Excavations of mires and hearths 
required pedological, geochemical, radiocarbon, 
palynological and microbiological inputs from a va-
riety of co-authors, all of which are listed on numer-
ous papers in reference lists as noted in this paper. 
While permits were obtained to carry out the geolog-
ical and biostratigraphic work, no attempt was made 
to obtain archaeological input beyond what is out-
lined in various papers. The only artifacts obtained 
are in the form of microbes and faecal matter ob-
tained from sections dug in sediment piles in various 
places and from cores taken in similar settings. The 
main findings of this research affirm the interpreta-
tions of Sir Gavin de Beer some decades ago that 
Hannibal for one reason or another took the highest 
and most difficult route into Italia across the Col de 
la Traversette. Indeed, even Polybius is on record 
saying that Hannibal took the highest route, later 
named in order of position south of the Col de Ge-
nèvre, Hannibal‘s pass. For the last two millennia, 
the Traversette has been known as ‗Hannibal‘s Pass‘ 
and even during WWII, SOE (Special Operations 
Executive of British Intelligence) referred to Mt. Ce-
nis as Napoleon‘s Route, the Traversette as Hanni-
bal‘s Route in secret documents recently made pub-
lic (Mulley, 2012).  
Polybius is also on record using the phrase—tas 
hyperbolas tas anōtatō tōn Alpeōn—the highest pass of 
the Alps (personal communication, J. Lazenby, 2007). 
Thus, whatever your historic theorem of possible or 
impossible routes, forensic analysis of all environ-
mental parameters in the ancient literature is heavily 
weighted in favor of Sir Gavin de Beer‘s southern 
route across the Traversette. Despite the single file 
approach off the col to the permanent snowbank 
above the discarded Italian army barracks at ~2650 
m asl, the only route assigned by key environmental 
parameters is the Traversette negotiated with diffi-
culty by the Hannibalic Army. 
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